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Abstract—Email is the most ubiquitous and interoperable
form of online communication today. However, email was not
conceived with strong security guarantees, and the ensuing
security enhancements are, by contrast, lacking in both ubiquity
and interoperability. This state of affairs motivates our work.
Our contributions include: (1) a systematization of secure email
approaches taken by industry, academia, and independent de-
velopers; (2) an evaluation framework for proposed or deployed
email security enhancements and a measurement of their security,
deployability, and usability; (3) a stakeholder analysis and
informed discussion of the current state of secure email; and
(4) a research agenda highlighting open problems judged to be
useful in pursuing secure email.
I. INTRODUCTION
For its over 50-year history, email has been an open medium—
if you know someone’s email address, you can send email
to them [105]. It provides seamless interoperability among
users with a diverse range of desktop, mobile, and web client
software. As an indication of its near-universal acceptance, an
email address is often required to create online accounts and
to make online purchases. As of 2017, there were 6.3 billion
email accounts, owned by 3.7 billion users, sending over 269
billion email messages per day [109].
Despite its ubiquity, email was created without security
in mind and remains largely insecure today [32], [40], [92],
[62]. Email is only sometimes transmitted over an encrypted
connection, with limited protection from passive network
eavesdropping and active network attacks. There is only limited
protection against message forgery. Email archives are typically
extensive, stored in plaintext, and vulnerable to hacking. Spam
and malware are prevalent, though filtered by many email
providers. Phishing and spear phishing [112] remain problems.
Secure email products based on S/MIME, such as Microsoft
Outlook and IBM Notes, have been adopted when there is sig-
nificant motivation to protect intellectual property (enterprises)
or conform with regulatory burdens (government). However,
non-enterprise users have fewer choices. PGP has long been the
champion of secure email for the masses but has been plagued
by lack of adoption and severe usability issues surrounding
key management. A variety of experts are abandoning it,
including Phil Zimmermann [41], the creator of PGP; Moxie
Marlinspike [90], who called PGP a “a glorious experiment
that has run its course,” and Filippo Valsorda [132], who
bemoans the challenges of maintaining long-term PGP keys.
Academic research has invested significant effort in improving
email PKI for non-enterprise users (enterprise users are often
the beneficiaries of IT staff), but has made little impact on
deployed software after nearly 20 years.
The relatively low level of adoption of secure email is
often contrasted with the wider success of secure messaging
applications. WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger have over
a billion users, while iMessage, Signal, Telegram, Line, and
Viber have millions. The best of these provide forward secrecy
and message deniability [15], [106] in addition to end-to-end
encryption. Yet, despite some calls to abandon secure email
in favor of Signal [132], there are important reasons to not
give up on email. Email is an open system, in contrast to
messaging’s walled gardens, giving it fundamentally different
uses, often involving longer messages, archival, search, and
attachments. Email is likely to continue to be a primary form
of communication on the Internet for years to come, and
users of the service could benefit from added privacy. Our
work is an important addition to the literature, which already
includes an excellent systemization of knowledge of secure
messaging [131].
Security architectures for email are complicated by its service
expectations, including universal interoperability, archive, and
search. For example, acquiring public keys in a single adminis-
trative domain can be done almost transparently to the user, but
many complications arise when expecting interoperability with
countless unrelated and uncoordinated administrative domains
worldwide. The expectation that anyone can email anyone
else directly leads to the need for spam and malware filtering,
along with protection from phishing. Secure messaging largely
avoids the need for these features by restricting who can contact
you. Finally, archive and search make it challenging to provide
encryption for webmail or for mobile clients, since in both cases
email is typically stored on a service provider’s infrastructure,
where access to plaintext is currently needed for these features.
Securing email is a thorny problem. Not only is ubiquitous
deployment of secure email elusive, none seems evident on the
horizon. There are many stakeholders involved and a variety of
use cases for secure email, making it hard for a single solution
to emerge. Our primary goals are to examine the history of
failures and successes in secure email, including what the term
‘secure email’ even means to different stakeholders; to identify
roadblocks and to distinguish the ones that might be removed;
to identify tradeoffs among existing systems and clarify how
they address different needs; and to use our acquired knowledge
to nudge future efforts in fruitful directions.
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Fig. 1. Overview of email operation and protocols. (1) Sending email generally
uses SMTP or HTTPS between a client and its mail server. (2) Delivery of
email between mail servers uses SMTP. (3) Receiving email generally uses
POP, IMAP, or HTTPS. (4) A recipient mail server may forward email to
another server. (5) A recipient mail server may forward an incoming email to
a set of mailing list subscribers.
II. BACKGROUND
To provide some context for our discussion of efforts to
secure email, we first describe how email works, explain why it
is insecure, and illustrate how criminals leverage this insecurity.
A. How Email Works
A series of protocols are used to send email, transfer it from
the sender’s email provider to the recipient’s provider, and then
retrieve it. Figure 1 shows the most basic steps involved, in
steps marked (1) through (3). When a user initiates sending an
email, her client may use SMTP [76] to submit the message
to her organization’s mail server. The sender’s mail server
uses DNS to locate the mail server for the recipient’s domain,
then uses SMTP to transfer the message. Finally, the recipient
retrieves the message from her own organization’s mail server,
possibly using POP or IMAP. If either the sender or receiver is
using webmail, then step 1 or step 3 may use HTTPS instead.
Note also that the version of SMTP used to submit a message
in step 1 is modified from the version of SMTP used to transfer
messages [50].
This sequence of events is complicated somewhat by
additional features supported by email, shown by steps (4)
and (5) in Figure 1. First, a receiving mail server can be
configured to forward email for a recipient on to another mail
server; e.g., forwarding email from bob@company.org to
bob@gmail.com. This can repeat an arbitrary number of
times. Second, a destination email address may correspond to a
mailing list server which forwards the email to all subscribers
on the list (a potentially large number). This adds numerous
other recipient email servers to the process.
B. Why Email is Insecure
Every aspect of email was initially specified, designed, and
developed without consideration for security. As a result, these
initial designs led to numerous problems, many of which
persist today despite decades of work to fix them. Consider
one example: as originally designed, there is no authenticity
for email messages. This means anyone could send email to
anyone else, using a fake sender email address.
To see how this is possible, it is useful to distinguish between
the two parts of an email message: the envelope and the body.
The envelope contains SMTP commands that direct mail servers
regarding how the message should be delivered. These consist
of connection negotiation (HELO or EHLO), the sender’s email
address (MAIL FROM), one or more recipient addresses (RCPT
TO), and potentially additional options. Of particular note is
that the original specifications of SMTP do not include any
validation of the sender’s email address. In addition, many
email servers were initially set up to accept email from any
client, known as open relays.
Combined, these features meant that anyone could forge an
email to anyone else, leading to the emergence of what we
call unsolicited email or spam [75]. Moreover, the message
body has a separate format [26], including the familiar From,
To, CC, and Subject header fields. Email clients generally
display the sender’s email address shown in the From header,
rather than the one in the SMTP envelope. Again, the original
specifications contain nothing that prevents forgery of the From
header. The features of email that make it open to spam also
make it vulnerable to phishing and delivery of malware.
In addition to lacking authenticity, the original designs of
protocols used to send, receive, and deliver email among
clients and servers contained no protections for integrity or
confidentiality. All messages were transmitted in the clear and
could be intercepted and modified by anyone able to act as a
man-in-the-middle. Email is also subject to privacy violations
because it does not easily provide anonymity, deniability,
freedom from tracing, and ephemerality.
C. How Criminals Use Email
As long as unsolicited emails reliably reach the inboxes
of potential victims, email is destined to remain a dominant
vehicle for crime. Two prominent examples are spam (both for
sales and for malware) and social engineering.
In the early 2010s, a successful campaign might see a
spammer employ a botnet of 3,000 compromised machines to
send 25 billion emails to 10 million addresses [65]. Each aspect
of the pipeline—from the compromised machines to the email
list to the software tools—might be sold by specialists [84], and
the campaign itself is typically run by third-party advertisers
earning pay-per-click revenue for directing traffic to a third-
party site (e.g., storefronts for unregulated pharmaceuticals
constitute over a third of spam) [93].
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Social engineering may be crafted as a generic attack or a
targeted attack against specific individuals. The openness of
email enables direct contact with targets and an opportunity to
mislead the target through the content of the email, a spoofed or
look-alike send address, and/or a malicious file attachment [98],
[58]. As an illustrative example, HR department employees of
the security company RSA were sent an email with a malicious
Excel file (exploiting a zero-day embedded Flash vulnerability)
masquerading as a recruitment plan; at least one opened the file,
and their computer was compromised, eventually leading to a
deep infiltration of the company’s network [112]. Spam filters
are trained to detect bulk email delivery, which presents new
challenges for classifying bespoke spear phishing emails [79]
and training employees [19].
III. HOW SERVICE PROVIDERS SECURE EMAIL
Email service providers have adopted a number of technolo-
gies to improve the security of email, including link encryption,
domain and sender authentication, and spam and malware
mitigation. Here we review current and planned efforts, the
protection they offer, and measurements that reveal that these
technologies have had a large variance of effectiveness to date.
A. Link Encryption
Email providers have adopted methods for encrypting email
while it is in transit between mail servers or between a mail
server and a client. We call this link encryption to distinguish
it from end-to-end encryption, which occurs between the
email sender and recipient. Link encryption is designed to
prevent eavesdropping and tampering by third parties that
may own untrusted routers along the path that email is being
delivered [60].
By default, mail sent using SMTP is sent in the clear,
but the connection may be upgraded to use TLS with the
STARTTLS command [60]. This is known as opportunistic
encryption. Because this is negotiated in plaintext, it is trivial
for an adversary to mount a downgrade attack by corrupting
or stripping the STARTTLS command [32].
To fix this problem, a March 2016 Internet draft introduced
Strict Transport Security for SMTP [89]. With STS, email
providers may use DNS records to advertise a policy requiring
TLS connections for SMTP. A receiving mail server can
authenticate the policy it receives (ensuring it is valid for
the sending domain) using a variety of mechanisms, such as
with the Certificate Authority system or with DANE [11], [61].
Sending mail servers can report on or refuse to deliver messages
that cannot be delivered using TLS.
For communication between mail client and a mail server,
a variety of encryption methods can be used. A client using
POP or IMAP can start encryption using STARTTLS [102].
However, many servers are now disabling plain IMAP and
POP and instead requiring clients to connect over TLS. Clients
using webmail can use HTTPS to provide encryption between
the recipient mail server and the client. Clients may also submit
email using SMTP and the STARTTLS command.
One additional concern is that SMTP reveals significant
metadata as email messages are relayed, such as sender and
recipient email addresses. Some work tries to address this
concern [86], [127], but no significant work beyond draft stages
exists as of this writing.
B. Domain Authentication
Email providers have invested significant effort in providing
domain authentication, which ensures that an email originated
from a specific domain. Consider the case when Alice receives
an email from bob@gmail.com. Domain authentication
indicates that the email was sent by a server authorized
to send email from gmail.com. This is contrasted with
sender authentication, §III-D, which occurs when gmail.com
authenticates bob to access and send email. A third step is user
authentication, which occurs when Alice ensures that a human,
such as Bob Smith, owns the bob@gmail.com account.
Domain authentication has a long history rooted in identi-
fying spam and filtering malware [75], [38], [78], [6]. These
authentication methods provide assurance that the originating
domain of an email, either as listed in the header or the
envelope, actually sent the email.
1) DKIM: DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [27], [77]
allows a server that originates email to include a digital
signature over some portions of the email. The signature can
include the entire message (header and body) or just selected
fields in the header, but signatures are not applied to the
envelope. The sending server hashes the fields to be signed
and digitally signs the hash with the private key of the sender’s
domain. The sending server also inserts a message header
field indicating which domain should be used for checking
the signature. A receiving email provider uses this header to
determine the domain, retrieves the public key of the sending
provider via DNS, then verifies the signature. Assuming email
providers use DNSSEC to ensure that public keys received via
DNS are legitimate, this provides assurance that the sending
email provider did originate the email and that the signed fields
have not been modified in transit.
2) SPF: Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [75] allows an
organization to publish a DNS record that specifies which IP
addresses are allowed to originate email for their domain. A
receiving provider can verify that the IP address of the server
that originates the email is on the list of approved addresses
for the domain in the envelope MAIL FROM field. These
IP addresses do not necessarily need to be owned by the
domain; they can, for example, be IP addresses from a separate
email provider. SPF breaks mail forwarding, but a mail server
can instead use remailing, which changes the envelope sender
domain to match that of the forwarder.
3) DMARC: Domain Message Authentication, Reporting,
and Conformance (DMARC) [78] builds on these technologies
by allowing an organization to publish a DNS record indicating
which of these services (DKIM, SPF) they support, along with
a policy indicating what action should be taken if authentication
fails. DMARC also requires identifier alignment. For SPF, this
means that the domain in the envelope From address (which is
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authenticated with SPF) must match the domain in the header
From address. For DKIM, this means that the domain used for
signing must match the domain in the header From address.
This links the authentication or signature verification done by
SPF and DKIM to the From address seen by the user. DMARC
also provides a mechanism for receiving email providers to
send reports back to sending email providers regarding the
outcomes of DMARC policy enforcement. This helps email
providers identify misconfigurations and abuse.
4) ARC: Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) [6], [67]
extends email authentication to handle cases when messages
are potentially modified and then forwarded, such as by a
mailing list. With ARC, a forwarder adds headers indicating
the status of validity checks done on authentication added by
the originator or other intermediate forwarder (i.e., SPF, DKIM,
DMARC, or ARC). The forwarder then adds a signature over
the message body and header as it received it, then adds another
signature (called a seal) over any ARC fields added by this
or previous forwarders. When there are multiple forwarders
involved, the set of ARC fields added forms an ARC chain.
C. Measurement Studies of Adoption and Effectiveness
A number of papers [32], [40], [92], [62] have measured
the level of adoption and effectiveness of the encryption and
domain authentication used by email providers. These papers
conduct a variety of active measurements of email servers and
passive measurements of ongoing email traffic. The general
picture they paint is that top email providers encrypt messages
with STARTTLS and use SPF and DKIM for authentication,
but there is a long tail of organizations that are lagging in
deploying these mechanisms.
Even when security solutions are deployed, they are often
compromised by insecure practices. The above studies find
that of those servers that offer encryption, many use self-
signed certificates, expired certificates, or broken chains, all of
which cause the validation of the certificate to fail. There are
numerous other cases in which email traffic uses weak cipher
suites, weak cryptographic primitives and parameters, weak
keys, or plain authentication over unencrypted connections.
Of the techniques that rely on DNS, basic attacks such as
DNS hijacking, dangling DNS pointers [88], and modifying
non-DNSSEC lookups can enable circumvention. Stripping
attacks can compromise STARTTLS, with Durumeric et al. [32]
illustrating how these attacks caused 20% of inbound Gmail
messages to be sent in cleartext for seven countries. Use of SPF
is common, but enforcement is limited, and DNS records often
aren’t protected with DNSSEC. There is little use of DKIM,
and few servers reject invalid DKIM signatures [40]. As Mayer
et al. [92] conclude, “the global email system provides some
protection against passive eavesdropping, limited protection
against unprivileged peer message forgery, and no protection
against active network-based attacks.”
D. Sender Authentication
The methods discussed above authenticate only the sending
domain and do not guarantee that the sending user was authenti-
cated by the domain. Most email domains do authenticate their
users [59]. For example, if the sender is using webmail, then
she may authenticate by logging into her webmail account over
HTTPS. If the sender is using a desktop client, the mail domain
can authenticate her with SMTP Authentication, which provides
a number of methods that enable the sender to authenticate
with the mail server by a username and password [124], [125],
[123]. However, the measures a domain uses to authenticate
a sender are not communicated to the recipient of an email
message, nor can they be verified by the recipient.
E. Spam and Malware Mitigation
Providers and enterprises have invested significant effort
in spam and malware filtering. Malware filtering is often
performed by comparing email attachments to signatures of
known malware. Spam filtering has evolved from IP blacklists
to highly sophisticated classifiers that examine content, meta-
information including origin, user reports, and protocol details
such as SMTP header fingerprints [129], [130]. Spammers use
a variety of evasion techniques, including sending from the IP
addresses of malware-compromised computers [42], spoofing
sender addresses, and encoding text as images. A more esoteric
approach to spam prevention is requiring the sender to compute
a costly function to send an email [33], [8]—an approach that
never caught on [81].
IV. END-TO-END ENCRYPTION
While provider-based solutions have focused on preventing
spam, filtering malware, and stopping passive eavesdropping,
end-to-end encryption is designed to provide security guar-
antees that enable users themselves (whether individuals or
corporations) to exchange secure email without revealing
plaintext to third parties. In addition to encryption, these efforts
usually include digital signatures and integrity as well. Here
we review these initiatives to gain insight into why these efforts
have failed to enjoy widespread use.
A. PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail)
The first major effort to secure email was PEM [73], which
was designed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, resulting
in proposed Internet standards [87], [72], [10], [68] that are
now designated “Historic”. The primary goals of PEM were
end-to-end email security with confidentiality, data origin
authentication, connectionless integrity (order not preserved),
non-repudiation with proof of origin, and transparency to
providers and to SMTP.
PEM offers important lessons as the first completely ar-
chitected and operational end-to-end secure email system.
It identified and solved many—but not all—of the difficult
challenges still confronting today’s proposals:
1) Interoperability: PEM was designed to be interoperable
with existing email transport mechanisms and non-PEM
recipient clients. For example, signed messages could be sent
so that intervening mail servers could modify the message
during processing; this invalidated the signature but allowed
non-PEM clients to read the message.
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2) Hierarchical Trust: PEM used X.509 certificates and a
hierarchical trust model with a single root CA, which simplified
trust resolution and restricted namespace authority (thus largely
precluding rogue certificate issues haunting later PKI systems).
3) Revocation: PEM had a centralized certificate revocation
design, which placed primary responsibility for distributing
revocation information on the infrastructure rather than end-
users. Every CA was required to distribute CRLs and provide
their users access to global CRL information, coordinated with
the root CA.
4) Validation: PEM specified that clients originating mail
could include all certificates that recipients needed to process
it; caching by recipients could expedite and/or accommodate
missing certificates. A PEM client could thus automatically
map email addresses or local aliases to distinguished names in
certificates and thereby public keys.
5) Anonymity: PEM accommodated anonymous users with
persona certificates, which could provide assurances of conti-
nuity of a pseudonymous user ID.
A contributing factor cited [104] in PEM’s demise was its
slow progress in evolving for Multipurpose Internet Mail Ex-
tensions (MIME) [43], the standard for including attachments,
multi-part bodies, and non-ASCII character sets. Industry
supported S/MIME, while privacy advocates favored PGP
because it was free from the restrictions imposed by PEM’s
centralized and hierarchical organization.
B. S/MIME
S/MIME [107] is a standards suite for securing MIME data
with both encryption and digital signatures. It was originally
developed during the early 1990s by RSA Data Security, then
later adopted by the IETF, resulting in standards in 1999 [108],
[107]. Of note, S/MIME makes use of the Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) [63], which had origins in PEM
and PKCS. S/MIME uses a supporting suite of certificate
management protocols, including RFC 5280 [24], which defines
an IETF subset of X.509v3 certificates. S/MIME has wide
support on major platforms and products, such as IBM (Lotus)
Notes and Microsoft Outlook mail clients [104, p.60-62].
S/MIME has many similarities with PEM but also important
differences. Its X.509v3 certificates, designed to support email
interoperability (among other application uses), are generally
issued by third-party Certificate Authorities (CAs) operating
under a centralized trust model, with CAs also responsible for
certificate revocation information. X.509v3 extensions define
information such as whether a certificate holds the public key
of a CA or a non-CA entity (e.g., useful for properly verifying
certificate chains), and what the key may be used for (e.g.,
signatures vs. encryption). Unlike PEM, S/MIME does not
mandate a hierarchy with a single root CA—any organization
can act as an independent, trusted root for its certificates, and
this is its most common usage today. Recent industry initiatives
to facilitate interoperability between key management clients
and key management servers are being advanced by the OASIS
standards body with the Key Management Interoperability
Protocol (KMIP) [103].
The centralized certificate management supported by
S/MIME is a good match for internal communication within
enterprises and governments. This has led to some large de-
ployments of S/MIME in commercial or government silos [20].
However, this has led to limited adoption by individual users.
As noted by Garfinkel and Miller [46], individuals that do not
belong to an organization must manage their own public key
pairs and certificates and also find the correct public key for a
recipient, without the benefit of a dedicated IT staff.
A number of works have examined usability deficiencies
with S/MIME implementations. Kapadia [71] conducted a
case study of S/MIME and reported that vendors install too
many trusted CAs, opening users to the potential for man-in-
the-middle attacks. He notes it is difficult for users to know
which CAs to trust and discusses comparing key fingerprints
via a phone call as one alternative. Fry et al. [44] used a
cognitive walkthrough of three S/MIME clients to show that
usability challenges persist, particularly involving certificate
management. Orman [104, p.60–67] notes that the inconsistent
handling of certificates in clients—depending on whether the
operating system, the mail client, or special certificate manager
software receives a certificate—can be a barrier to deployment
and causes usability issues. One solution used is to integrate
identity with other enterprise systems, then automatically create
and distribute signing and encryption keys whenever a new
account is created. This is the case with IBM (formerly Lotus)
Notes and Groove [45].
C. PGP
PGP eschews a centralized trust model for an egalitarian web
of trust, in which every user independently decides which public
keys to associate with a given email address and whom to trust
to vouch for those keys. Ever since its 1991 release by Phil Zim-
mermann as “public key cryptography for the masses” [141],
supporters have promoted PGP as a de facto world standard for
encryption. Its founding motivation as “guerrilla cryptography”
to counter authorities [141] has made it a combined religion/cult
and political movement especially favored by privacy advocates
who reject big-business and government. This mindset, and
the tendency of enterprise organizations to favor S/MIME, has
led to a market bifurcation. Arguably, the resulting product
indecision and non-interoperability has negatively impacted the
deployment of secure email in general.
PGP’s history is a fascinating 25-year tale of controversy,
architectural zig-zags, name ambiguity, and patent disputes,
with changes in algorithms, formats and functionality; commer-
cial vs. non-commercial products; corporate brand ownership;
and circumvention of U.S. crypto export controls.1 The current
standard for the PGP message format is OpenPGP [17], [34],
a patent-unencumbered variation of PGP.
1PGP was distributed as freeware on the Internet in 1991, leading to an
investigation of Zimmermann by the United States Customs Office for allegedly
violating U.S. export laws. He published the PGP source code in book form
in 1995 [139], and the case was subsequently dropped in 1996 [82].
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Despite evolving formats or encryption algorithms, PGP
enthusiasts until recently have largely remained faithful to
PGP’s distinguishing concepts:
1) PGP key packets and lightweight certificates: PGP key
packets hold bare keys (public or private). Public keys are
kept in lightweight certificates (cf. [141]), which are not signed
certificates in the X.509 sense, but instead contain keys and a
User ID, in the form of a user name and email address.
To allow client software to properly use bare public keys,
they are accompanied by further fields composing transferable
public keys [17], which reconstruct some certificate functional-
ity. These include one or more User ID packets each followed
by zero or more signature packets. The latter attest the signing
party’s belief that the public key belongs to the user denoted
by User ID.
2) PGP keyrings: Key rings are collections of one or more
keys in a file or database. Public keyrings store collected public
keys; private keyrings store a user’s own private key(s), with
each individual key encrypted under a symmetric key derived
from a user-chosen passphrase.
3) PGP’s web of trust: The web of trust is a model in which
users personally decide whether to trust public keys of other
users, which may be acquired through personal exchanges or
from public servers, and which may be endorsed by other users
they explicitly designate to be trusted introducers, a sort of ad
hoc Certification Authority [140]. Client software tracks the
resulting trust level within a user’s keyring(s).
4) PGP key servers: Users publish their public key to either
closed or publicly accessible key servers, which contain a
mapping of email address to the public key. Clients query to
locate the public key associated with an email address.
PGP’s design around the web of trust has allowed quick
deployment in small groups without bureaucracy or costs
of formal Certification Authorities [94], but leads to other
significant obstacles. A variety of limitations in PGP are evident
when examining The official PGP user’s guide, written by Phil
Zimmermann in 1995, and the history of PGP.
a) Scalability beyond small groups: Zimmermann
notes [141, p.23], that “PGP was originally designed to handle
small personal keyrings”. Scaling PGP requires acquiring large
numbers of keys, along with a manual trust decision for each
key, plus manual management of keyrings and the key lifecycle.
b) Design failure to address revocation: Zimmermann
writes [141, p.31], “If your secret key is ever compromised,
you’d better get the word out quickly to all interested parties
(good luck!) before someone uses it to make signatures in your
name ... You just have to spread the word and hope everyone
hears about it”. PGP does have compromise certificates—a
user signature declares their key to be revoked. Creating these
requires the private key (which is unavailable if lost), and
distributing them to others is ad hoc. After creating one, [141,
p.32] “Then you must somehow send this compromised
certificate to everyone else on the planet...” Trusted introducers
may also sign revocation certificates, but expecting ordinary
users set this up appears naively optimistic.
c) Usability by non-technical users: Users must under-
stand the differences between trusting a public key for personal
use, endorsing a public key for other users, and designating
others as trusted introducers. There is no system help or
recovery if users fail to back up their private key, or forget
their passphrase. The difficulty that this imposes on users is
nicely summarized by the PGP slogan that “PGP is for people
who prefer to pack their own parachutes” [141, p.31].
d) Trust model mismatch: “PGP tends to emphasize [an]
organic decentralized non-institutional approach” reflecting
personal social interaction rather than organizational relation-
ships [141, p.25]. The PGP web of trust was designed to
model social interaction, rather than decision-making processes
in governments and large enterprises. It is thus not a one-size-
fits-all trust model.
Of these problems, the poor usability of PGP has received
significant attention. In 1999, a formal user study of PGP
5 [135] demonstrated users were unable to successfully send
encrypted email in the context of a hypothetical political
campaign. The study uncovered serious usability issues with
key management and helped shape modern usable security
research. A number of subsequent laboratory studies [122],
[116] in the decades since then have continued to highlight
the poor usability of PGP. Indeed, many PGP clients continue
to expose the details of key management to users. Typical
user interactions include generating keys, creating and saving
a revocation certificate (in case of key loss), and importing
keys.
D. Dissemination of Public Keys
A variety of approaches have been used for disseminating
public keys and certificates, with terminology sometimes
becoming confused due to different approaches for S/MIME
and PGP. To alleviate this confusion, we define the following
terms for use in this paper:
a) certificate directory: A directory that publishes cer-
tificates signed by trusted issuers (e.g., CAs). The issuer is re-
sponsible for authenticating the owner of the certificate. Clients
(relying parties) are responsible for determining certificate
validity or trustworthiness. S/MIME typically uses a certificate
directory.
b) key packet server: A server that publishes public
keys of users, including metadata regarding the owner of the
key (such as name and email address) and signatures attesting
to the binding of the key with the owner. Clients are responsible
for determining the validity of any signatures on the packets
and deciding if they are trustworthy. PGP typically uses a key
packet server.
c) trusted public key server: A server that publishes
public keys of users, asserting a binding of the key to an owner
(such as an email address). The server is trusted to provide
valid bindings. This primitive relies on a secure connection
between clients and the public key server—for example, using
TLS.
d) public ledger: A ledger publishes certificates or key
packets in a manner that makes them visible to other parties. In
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particular, clients can examine a history of all certificates or key
packets that a ledger has made available for any entity, allowing
them to detect rogue certificates or keys and server equivocation.
Certificate transparency [80] is a ledger system for the web that
uses auditing to detect the issuance of malicious certificates.
Ryan has proposed an extension to certificate transparency
that provides efficient revocation [119] and designed an email
system that automates the exchange of public keys, end-to-end
encryption of email, and checking public ledgers. ARPKI [12]
is a ledger system that includes stronger security guarantees
and formal verification of its security properties. CONIKS [95]
is a system that allows users to efficiently monitor their own
public keys for non-equivocation, while also providing some
privacy properties. CONIKS also ensures that if a server has
lied about a public key to Alice once, then to avoid trivial
detection of the lie by Alice, it must keep lying to her in
the future, even if she asks about a different public key. This
provides Alice with a large window to check that she is being
lied to by a server, which she can detect by finding someone
who was told something different by that server at some time
in the past.
E. Storage of Private Keys
Issues of private key management have been discussed in
the PKI community since the 1990s [5, Chapter 7]. Private
keys used for decrypting email must be stored safely as long
as the encrypted email requires protection [96, Chapter 13.7].
Companies using secure email often retain access to private
keys in order to maintain access to all emails, to comply with
regulations, to scan email for spam or malware, or to detect
fraud or insider trading. A variety of enterprise software helps
companies manage these assets. For non-enterprise users, for
example using PGP, private keys are often stored online and
encrypted with a password, though hardware tokens are also
available. Operating systems provide seamless synchronization
of passwords, bookmarks, and contacts; similar methods could
be used to provide migration of private keys or certificates for
non-enterprise users [13]. NIST [20, p.76] recommends that
keys used for S/MIME and PGP be used only for messages in
transit, and that arriving mail that is intended to be archived
should be decrypted and then stored locally and re-encrypted
with new keys; e.g., in a cryptographic file system.
A related issue is the debate over government mandated
access to plaintext, which originally surfaced in the U.S. in
the 1990s and has been rekindled regularly. Proponents cite
fears that widespread use of end-to-end encryption will enable
criminals and terrorists to “go dark” and evade law enforcement.
In response, privacy advocates decry growing mass surveillance,
point to a history of abuses of wiretapping [29], and suggest that
market forces will ensure there is plenty of unencrypted data
for use by law enforcement regardless [47]. A 2015 paper from
Abelson et al. [1] highlights risks of regulatory requirements
in this area, reiterating many issues discussed in their earlier
1997 report [2]. Identified risks include reversing progress
made in deploying forward secrecy, leading to weaker privacy
guarantees when keys are compromised; substantial increases
to system complexity, making systems harder to secure; and
the concentration of value for targeted attacks. Their report also
highlights jurisdictional issues that create significant complexity
in a global Internet. More broadly, whenever service providers
have access to keys that can decrypt customer email, this allows
plaintext to be revealed due to incompetent or untrustworthy
service providers, by disillusioned employees, by government
subpoena, or by regulatory coercion.
F. Improving the Usability of Email PKI
Due to the limited success of secure email, a variety of
efforts have explored improving the usability of PKI for email,
primarily focusing on automating discovery of public keys.
This work applies to both S/MIME and PGP, since either the
centralized infrastructure (S/MIME) or the web of trust (PGP)
could be augmented or replaced with the methods we discuss
here. An important observation is that all of this work abandons
the web of trust around which PGP was originally designed.
1) Automatic public key servers: Recently, the usable
security community has studied automated use of trusted public
key servers. Ruoti et al. [117], [115] showed that automated key
management with identity-based encryption (IBE) resulted in
successful task completion and strong, positive user feedback.
Atwater et al. [7] showed that automated trusted public key
servers likewise have high usability when integrated into a
PGP-based email system. Bai et al. [9] found users prefer key
servers to manual key exchange, even after being taught about
the security limitations of a key server.
2) Social Authentication: Another way to disseminate public
keys is to associate them with public social media accounts.
The Keybase project helps users to post a signed, cryptographic
proof to their account, simultaneously demonstrating ownership
of a public key and ownership of the account. By aggregating
proofs across multiple accounts for the same person, a client
can establish evidence that ties a public key to an online
persona, under the assumption that it is unlikely that a person’s
social media accounts are all compromised simultaneously. The
Confidante email system [83] leverages Keybase for distribution
of encryption public keys, with a user study finding it was
usable for lawyers and journalists. The authors also find
differences in use cases and threat models, indicating that
a one-size-fits-all approach may not work.
3) Trust-on-first-use (TOFU): Another approach is to ex-
change keys in-band and have clients blindly trust them
on first use. This was integrated with an email system by
Roth et al. [113], using a novel postcard and letter metaphor
to distinguish between plaintext and encrypted email, and
Garfinkel and Miller [46], in a system designed to simplify
S/MIME for non-enterprise users. Masone and Smith [91]
studied this “first use” case by building a system to help users
decide whether to trust signed email from someone that they
don’t know. Since 2016, the developer community has been
integrating TOFU into PGP implementations in the MailPile,
PEP [14], LEAP [127], and autocrypt projects. A common
critique of TOFU is that users cannot distinguish valid key
changes from an attack. Recent work by developers in the
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PEP and LEAP projects are aiming to address this problem
with additional methods to authenticate public encryption keys,
such as downloading the public key for a recipient from the
recipient’s email provider (treating it as a trusted public key
server), checking that providers advertise consistent keys for
their users, and asking the user to compare key fingerprints [64],
[28].
4) Short-lived keys and forward secrecy: Schneier and
Hall [120] explored the use of short-term private keys to
minimize the damage resulting from the compromise of a
private key. Brown et al. [16] discuss timeliness in destroying
a short-lived key and how short-lived keys complicate usability
by requiring more frequent key dissemination. Off-the-Record
Communication (OTR) [15] expanded on this vision with
a protocol that provides perfect forward secrecy on instant
messaging platforms. The authors also discussed the use of OTR
for email, indicating that it could be used if two individuals
communicate frequently and don’t expect their initial message
to be encrypted. This work led to the double ratchet algorithm
used in Signal [106].
5) Encrypting Proxies: One approach to making interactions
with PKI transparent to users is to layer encryption and signing
below client software, as suggested by Levien et al. [85] and
Wolthusen [137]. A related approach for webmail systems is
hosted S/MIME, discussed in §V-D.
G. Why Users Don’t Encrypt Email
Much of the above work assumes that improving the usability
of end-to-end encryption will by itself speed the adoption of
secure email clients. However, this remains unclear. Surveys
and interviews with users have found reasons for non-adoption
include lack of concern, lack of perceived need, misconceptions
about how to obtain security, and poor awareness of effective
security practices [45], [110]. Similar themes have been found
in a study of adoption of secure messaging [3]. Other work
reports that users are unsure about when they would need secure
email [114] and are skeptical that any system can secure their
information [118]. It is not clear that users want to use digital
signatures or encryption for daily, non-sensitive messages [37],
and one study of encryption inside of an activist organization
found that many users felt routine use of secure email was
paranoid [48]. Related work in mental modelling has been
used to understand how users approach home security [134],
why users follow security advice [36], and how users perceive
privacy threats [70].
V. SECURING WEBMAIL
We now consider efforts to secure web-based email (or
webmail) clients. The distinguishing characteristic of webmail
is that email is accessed using a web browser, with HTTPS
generally used to send and retrieve email between the browser
and a web server. Much of this work can be generalized to
desktop or mobile clients, though there are some issues related
to browsers that require special attention.
A. Information Depots
One alternative to sending secure email is to send a plaintext
email with a link to a message that can be read on a separate
web-based system, an approach we refer to as an information
depot. All sensitive information is conveyed in the separate
message, which the recipient can access by authenticating
herself to the web system. This approach is common with banks,
insurance companies, universities and other entities needing to
communicate securely with their customers or students.
B. Secure Webmail Systems
A secure webmail system integrates email encryption (and
sometimes digital signatures) into a typical webmail interface.
Encryption between the service’s users is handled automatically;
the public key for a recipient is generally retrieved from
a trusted public key server run by the email provider, and
the email is encrypted with this key. This process is entirely
transparent to the user, and there is typically no method to
verify the fingerprint of the public keys.2 To send email to a
user of a different email provider, the sender typically chooses
a password and the system emails the recipient a link to the
email provider’s information depot. The recipient typically
decrypts the message in the web browser, using JavaScript to
download and decrypt the message with the password. Out-of-
band distribution of the password is left to the user. With rare
exception, most secure webmail systems do not offer secure
email that is interoperable with other secure email clients.3
Examples of secure webmail systems include ProtonMail,
Tutanota, and Hushmail. Some services, such as ProtonMail,
also offer mobile applications.
As compared to traditional desktop email software, secure
webmail systems introduce additional potential attacks. Each
time a user visits the site, their browser can potentially
download a different script, enabling an email provider (perhaps
under subpoena from a government) to insert malicious
JavaScript that reveals their password, encryption keys, or
plaintext. A standard is being developed by the W3C that
enables JavaScript to be signed, so that browsers can verify
downloaded code. However, even in this case, it is possible
for other JavaScript loaded on the same page to undermine the
security of any JavaScript library through DOM interactions or
manipulation of the execution environment. Additional methods
are needed to provide privilege separation for JavaScript in the
browser [97], [133].
Another security concern for webmail systems is private
key storage. In many systems, the private key is stored on the
email provider’s servers, encrypted with a password chosen by
the user, so that the user can easily access secure email from a
variety of devices. This requires the user to choose a password
strong enough to resist offline password attacks [39], in case
the private key storage is compromised or the service provider
is malicious. In addition, this same password is often used
2Fingerprint comparison is common with secure messaging applications but
the feature is often ignored by users [121].
3Hushmail allows users to send email to a PGP user at a different email
provider if the recipient uploads their public key to Hushmail’s key server.
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to authenticate the user to the webmail system. In this case,
the browser should not transmit the password to the service
provider when authenticating the user.4 Possible approaches
are hashing and salting the password in the browser before
sending it to the server to retrieve the encrypted private key
(Tutanota) or using the Secure Remote Password protocol [138]
(ProtonMail).
C. Browser Extensions
Another approach to providing secure webmail is to develop
a browser extension that enables users to send signed and
encrypted email with their existing webmail provider. One
category of extensions extends webmail to include PGP
functionality, typically automating some key management
tasks. Extensions in this category include Mailvelope and
FlowCrypt. There are also browser extensions that provide
automated S/MIME-based encryption and signing (Fossa
Guard), encryption with a symmetric key held by the service
(Virtu), and encryption using a password shared out of band
(SecureGmail).
Some security issues that must be addressed for secure
webmail systems likewise apply to browser extensions. The use
of a browser extension provides greater control over JavaScript
execution [13], reducing the need for auditing and privilege
separation. Extensions sometimes store end-user private keys on
a server managed by the extension, encrypted with a password,
while others use the browser’s localStorage implementation,
which typically results in key material being stored on the
client’s local disk. However, localStorage can be read by any
JavaScript loaded from the same server. One issue unique to
extensions is that they need a way of preventing the webmail
provider from accessing plaintext of emails and drafts (many
webmail providers sync drafts as a user types). An extension
can prevent this by using a secure browser overlay such as an
iframe [115].
D. Hosted S/MIME
A different approach to securing webmail is for the webmail
provider to handle all encryption for the client, including storing
the user’s private keys. This was suggested by Garfinkel et
al. [45] and Farrell [37] and implemented by Google in early
2017 as hosted S/MIME. An organization or user uploads
end-user public key certificates that have been signed by a
publicly trusted anchor CA, along with the private key for
each certificate. The provider then automatically encrypts and
signs messages to other users also participating in the service.
Because the provider can decrypt incoming emails, it can also
provide spam and malware filtering. This does not provide end-
to-end encryption, but provides more reliable confidentiality
than opportunistic link encryption.
4The original Lavabit service, which offered a secure webmail system and
was famous for having Edward Snowden as a client, sent the user’s password
to the server to unlock the private key. This meant Lavabit could use the
password to unlock the private key and read all the user’s emails, even if they
were stored in an encrypted format.
VI. PRIVACY
Message confidentiality is an email privacy enhancement
that has received considerable attention, however researchers
and developers have explored other privacy aspects including
anonymity, email traceability, deniability, and message ephemer-
ality. In terms of deployment and academic study, these areas
are further behind message confidentiality and subsequently,
we do not discuss them much outside of this section. We
highlight them here as important considerations beyond the
typical discussion of securing email.
A. Anonymity
Email senders may wish to remain anonymous: i.e., unlink
the contents of the email from their true email address, their
IP address, and/or the identity of their mail server. Senders
may also opt for pseudonymity [55] where a set of emails
are known to originate from the same person but no further
information is known.5 Generally speaking, email is sent
to chosen individuals or groups; thus, email receivers are
typically not fully anonymous but might be pseudonymous—
e.g., the recipient should be the same person who sent a prior
anonymous email.
One common template for anonymous email is to route
messages through multiple non-colluding servers and to layer
on cryptography to ensure all servers in the chain need to
be compromised to link together the message’s sender and
receiver [22]. Cryptographic return addresses could also be used
to send a message back from the receiver to the original sender,
even though no single server knows who the sender is. This idea
was championed by the cypherpunk movement [100], [101] and
adapted to the email protocol with remailers [54], [52], [53].
Not all remailers have the ability to reply to a received email,
however this limitation dovetailed with the prominent use case
of posting anonymous messages to email-based mailing lists,
where replies were collected as new messages sent to the
mailing list. This approach is more widely used for anonymous
web browsing (onion routing [56] and Tor [31]) than email.
A second template is much simpler: register a webmail
account under a pseudonymous address. As some webmail
providers will forward the user’s IP address with the message,
while others will not, users might opt to use Tor to access their
mailbox to hide their IP address. One real-world example of
this technique is Satoshi Nakamoto, the inventor of Bitcoin [99],
who corresponded over webmail for many months while
remaining anonymous.6 A less successful example was a
Harvard undergraduate student who emailed a bomb threat
to the university’s administration via webmail accessed over
Tor. In this case, the student was found to be the only individual
accessing Tor on the university’s own network during the time
the email was sent—while strictly circumstantial, the student
confessed [57]. This illustrates an important consideration:
5Note that pseudonymity and message authentication techniques, such as
DKIM or digital signatures, are not contradictory. The latter techniques bind
messages to keys and keys become pseudonyms. Pseudonymity forgoes the
further binding (via a PKI) of keys to identities.
6‘His’ anonymity continues to the time of writing.
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anonymity is realized as indistinguishability from a set of
plausible candidates—the set of other users at the time of
use [30]. Remailers have always had a small user-base which
leads to weak anonymity, despite the cryptographic protections.
B. Traceability
Modern email clients have browser-like features, weaving
together passive content from multiple sources and displaying
it to the user as a single message. Email senders have
for some time abused this functionality and encoded the
recipient’s information (such as their email address) into
external resources [35]: e.g., the URL of a single pixel image
that will be invisibly requested by the user’s mail client when
they load the email. Links in emails can also contain embedded
user information as URL parameters that are passed to the
server when users click. Outgoing requests may also include
eligible cookies and the user’s IP address. In total, email
tracking techniques can enable senders to determine when
each specific recipient views an email, from where, when a
link is clicked, and to tie (via third-party trackers) the recipient
to other collected information about their browsing habits.
As of 2018 there is a patchwork of solutions for traceability
in use by mail providers, servers, clients, and browsers (for
webmail) that is typically not comprehensive [35]. Prevention
of email tracking can be handled by the mail server which
might automatically fetch and cache all resources for the user
upon receipt of the mail. This hides the user’s access pattern to
the email. Mail clients (both client-side and web-based) might
blacklist requests to known trackers, and strip out sensitive
request headers like cookies and the referrer.
C. Deniability
An important component of end-to-end secure email is
the ability to sign messages. Signatures provide a degree of
non-repudiation: publicly verifiable evidence that a message
originated from the asserted sender. In some cases, such as
anonymous email above, the sender wants no evidence they
are the sender beyond the plaintext of the message itself.
Deniability considers a middle case where the recipient wants
to authenticate the sender but the sender does want the evidence
to be convincing to anyone else. Deniability is often considered
in instant messaging, where both parties are simultaneously
online and can engage in an interactive protocol [131]. By
contrast, email is generally non-interactive. Cryptographers
have suggested new signature types [21], [66], [111] to provide
deniability but with near-zero deployment in email clients. The
fine-print of these primitives include trusted third parties and/or
a robust PKI—the same issues limiting end-to-end secure email.
D. Ephemerality
Once sent, a sender loses control over an email and the
extent to which its contents will be archived. In recent
years, companies and organizations have been damaged by
unencrypted email archives being leaked to the press or the
public. The decrease in storage costs, both client-side and
cloud-based, have removed a previous need for many to delete
old emails. In order to automate a shorter retention period,
emails might contain a link to the message body which is
deposited with and automatically deleted by a trusted service
provider or a distributed network [49], [136]. This mechanism
can be composed with email but is not specific to email in any
way, and so we do not describe it further.
VII. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENHANCEMENTS FOR EMAIL
In the previous sections, we reviewed a spectrum of security
and privacy issues with email protocols, systems, and architec-
tures. We discussed the foundations of prominent security issues
in the protocols, the failure of secure email to gain significant
traction, and efforts to improve usability. In this section, we
evaluate—in a side-by-side, systematic way—the prominent
mechanisms and architectures proposed for improving email
through the use of cryptography: namely encryption, signatures,
and key/certificate management. A summary is given in Table I,
which categorizes the benefits of each according to Security,
Deployability, and Usability. We evaluate these proposals as
general approaches rather than specific technologies that might
change over time (e.g., we evaluate end-to-end encryption and
signatures rather than PGP or S/MIME). Concrete deployments
mix and match from these proposals; we show compositions
for common systems in Table II.
A. Evaluation Framework
In Table I, we break email enhancements (rows) into two
categories—crypto primitives refer to specific cryptographic
approaches for securing email, while key management prim-
itives indicate how keys are managed. We evaluated four
cryptographic primitives and eight key management primitives.
To rate each primitive, we identified fifteen key properties
(columns) which collectively describe its security, deployability,
and usability. Properties are worded so that the fulfillment
of a column is considered beneficial. For each property,
enhancements are assigned a score regarding to how well they
satisfy that property—full support ( ), partial support (G#), or
no support (#). In some cases, the rating a primitive receives
will depend on the key management used (L). In other cases,
the property will not apply to that primitive, and no rating is
given (empty cell). In Appendix A we describe the properties,
cryptographic primitives, and key management primitives in
greater detail.
B. Summary findings
Based on our Table I, we identify the following highlights:
1) No one-size-fits-all solution: Email provider-based ap-
proaches (R2, R3, R5) are easily deployed and highly usable,
but they offer only modest security gains. End-to-end encryp-
tion can provide significant security benefits (e.g., R4+R12), but
has significant deployment and usability hurdles—for example,
requiring updates to client software and disrupting the ability of
servers to provide content processing (e.g., spam and malware
filtering). As such, it is unlikely that any single secure email
system will be suitable for all users and their various use cases.
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R3 Signature by originating mail server III-B # G# # # L L #  L G#   
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R5 Hosted encryption and signing V-D G# G# # # # L L #  L L  L L  
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R6 Certificate authority IV-B #  #   # # #  #
R7 Certificate directory (e.g., S/MIME) IV-D #  G#  # G# #   #
R8 Manual public key distribution IV-C   # #  # # # # #
R9 Web-of-trust IV-C3 G#  # #  # # # G# #
R10 Key packet server (e.g., PGP) IV-D G#  G#  # # # G# G# #
R11 Trusted public key server IV-D #  G#  # G# #   #
R12 Public ledger IV-D G#    # G# #   #
R13 Trust on first use IV-F3   # #  # # #  #
R14 Shared secret V-B   # #   # # #  
 Full support G# Partial Support # No support L Depends on key management
TABLE I
A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF PRIMITIVES USED TO ENHANCE EMAIL SECURITY.
# System Crypto Key Management
S1 TLS between client and server R2 R6
S2 TLS between servers R2 R13
S3 DKIM R3 R7
S4 Corporate S/MIME R4 R6, R7
S5 PGP R4 R8, R9, R10
S6 Secure Webmail R4 R14, R11
S7 Google’s Hosted S/MIME R5 R6
S8 Confidante R4 R12
TABLE II
MAPPING BETWEEN EXISTING SYSTEMS AND TABLE I.
2) Limitations of no trusted third parties: Manual public
key distribution (R8), trust on first use (R13), and shared
secrets (R14) all reject the use of third parties for public key
dissemination and verification. While there is a security benefit
to not relying on third parties to disseminate public keys, it
makes it difficult to retrieve public keys for individuals with
whom the user does not regularly interact. In many cases, it
may be impractical to establish an out-of-band (i.e., non-email)
communication channel to exchange certificates, potentially
preventing two users from communicating securely with email.
Additionally, this lack of a third party makes it difficult to
quickly and fully disseminate revocation information. When a
user’s private key has been compromised, they must notify all
of their contacts of this compromise and provide them with the
compromised user’s new certificate. This process is potentially
time consuming and opens up a significant avenue for social
engineering. Compromised users must also update any medium
they have used to share their compromised certificate—for
example, on a website or a business card. Critically, users
who previously obtained the compromised certificate, but who
have not yet been in contact with the compromised party, will
remain unaware of the revocation.
3) Distributing trust between third parties: Instead of
fully rejecting third parties for public key dissemination and
verification, it is possible to get many of the same security
benefits by distributing trust between multiple parties. This can
be accomplished in three (non-mutually exclusive) ways.
First, one entity can handle key dissemination and verifica-
tion, but its operations can be audited by several other parties—
as with a public ledger (R12). This approach maintains the
benefits of having a central location for key discovery (P7 and
P13), with the added benefit that multiple third parties need to
be compromised for the system to be compromised.
Second, one entity can handle key dissemination, but with
public key verification provided by multiple, independent
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parties. One example is a key packet server (R10), since key
packets contain signatures from additional parties attesting to
their validity. A user selects which of these parties they will
trust (i.e., trust agility) and the user will remain secure as
long as their chosen set of verifiers are trustworthy (i.e., they
validate public keys properly) and are not compromised. This
approach maintains the ability to have responsive revocation
(P7) because there is a single entity that distributes keys
and provides revocation status. However it disrupts effortless
encryption key discovery and signing key validation (P13 and
P14). It is common that users (even experts) will simply lack
the information needed to determine whether another party is
properly validating public keys. Even if this is possible, a user
may not trust any of the verifiers that the public key’s owner
uses to attest their ownership of the public key.
Third, instead of having a single third party responsible
for disseminating keys—as was assumed when evaluating
certificate directories (R7), key packet servers (R10), trusted
public key servers (R11), and public ledgers (R12)—multiple
parties could could be responsible for key dissemination. For
example, there could be multiple certificate directories or
trusted public key servers, and users would select which parties
they trust to handle this key distribution, leading to the same
benefits and limitations as the second approach. One related
idea discussed among PGP developers is to have a trusted
public key server for each email domain, which leads to users
having to decide which email providers they trust.
4) Usability benefits of key recovery: As discussed in §IV-E,
there are significant security limitations for systems that rely on
key recovery and important reasons why privacy-sensitive end
users may not trust any third party to hold their private key. On
the other hand, Table I also demonstrates important usability
benefits that can be offered by hosted encryption and signing
(R5), which are countered by the drawback of making the
private key available to others (P5). In particular, key recovery
allows for support of server-side processing of email message
contents (P12) and ensures that users’ private keys are always
recoverable (P15). The lack of support for these features in
other key management primitives is a significant impediment
to their adoption in practice.
5) Public ledgers offer promise: Of all the key management
primitives, public ledgers (R12) rate most strongly in terms of
security, at the expense of low deployability. While they do
rely on third parties, they diffuse this trust across multiple third
parties. They provide both effortless encryption key discovery
(P13) and signing key validation (P14), something none of the
other non-directory schemes (R6–R9, R13–R14) supply.
6) Areas warranting additional research: End-to-end en-
cryption conflicts with server-side processing of email. Unfor-
tunately, this interferes with core functionalities of email—for
example, search and spam filtering—that are more difficult to
provide without support from a provider’s computing resources.
If end-to-end encryption is to be used more widely, this
limitation will need to be addressed (cf. [126], [51], [69]). In
addition, none of the primitives in Table I address anonymity
or meta-data privacy, warranting further research (see §VI).
VIII. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
It’s worth considering whether anybody cares enough about
secure email to make it worthwhile putting in the effort that
would be required to design and deploy it. Do users perceive
enough risk from plaintext email, and enough confidence in
a secure email solution (and their ability to use it), that they
will make the effort to adopt and use it? A brief analysis of
stakeholders illustrates some of the complexities involved:
a) Enterprises: Enterprises have an incentive to deploy
secure email systems for internal communication, however
corporate email security often prioritizes scanning incoming
email for malware and ensuring outgoing email does not reveal
company intellectual property. For external communication,
many companies compete on service and costs rather than
privacy, and security often reduces perceived level of service
(due to usability) and increases costs. Thus, use of secure email
is likely to be driven more by regulation or liability/lawsuit, than
by companies voluntarily undertaking the burdens it imposes.
This helps explain why consumer communication often takes
place in information depots, in fields such as banking and
healthcare. The ease with which information depots can be
deployed and used reduces the incentive for businesses to help
end users adopt end-to-end encryption.
b) Product vendors: When security products are marketed
to end users, the “market for lemons” problem arises. Due to
asymmetry in information between vendors and consumers,
users have no way of measuring the security of a product
accurately, and so they can’t distinguish between secure and
insecure services. The natural result is a stampede toward low-
cost, more usable products and services; secure email loses in
this environment.
c) End users: Non-enterprise end users have the power
to choose among different secure email options provided to
them or to continue using plaintext email. Most users to date
have chosen plaintext and demand for secure email appears
weak. Although some secure webmail systems report having
over a million subscribers, this is small compared to billions of
worldwide email users. As mentioned in IV-G, primary reasons
for lack of adoption of secure email include lack of concern and
lack of perceived need. Another complication is that any email
products that don’t support server-side spam/malware filtering
and search features are unlikely to be chosen, at least until new
techniques that work on encrypted archives are practical [126],
[51], [69]. Users are more likely to notice the impact of lack of
filtering and search than lack of privacy, since privacy violations
are often silent.
d) Email providers: Email providers, driven by end user
demand, have focused primarily on spam and malware filtering,
along with link encryption. Deploying end-to-end encryption
conflicts with filtering, and the need for interoperability between
email providers further hampers deployment.
e) Privacy evangelists: Organizations that advocate for
increased consumer privacy encourage greater end user adop-
tion of secure email. These organizations typically sponsor
development projects and educate end-users about privacy
concerns and available products. However, advocacy methods
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are limited in their effectiveness. A technocratic approach,
which involves experts telling the general public what they
think the public should know, is considered harmful [128].
f) Governments: Governments have enacted regulations
that both safeguard email privacy and hamper it, so it is difficult
to predict how they may impact the adoption of secure email.
For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
in the European Union governs use of collected personal data
(such as email contents), which could provide an incentive to
encrypt data at rest in order to avoid liability. Conversely, in
the U.S., the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA) has been interpreted to mean that email stored online
for over 180 days is abandoned and can be accessed without a
warrant. The Email Privacy Act proposes to close this loophole,
but this legislation is not yet adopted, despite broad support
from the tech industry.
Based on this analysis, we offer the following observations
on the general state of secure email.
O1: Email today offers little protection. While email proto-
cols support link encryption and domain authentication, lack of
adoption and the availability of easy attacks mean that plaintext
email is subject to passive and active eavesdropping, as well
as message forgery. If providers could solve these issues and
offer provider-to-provider encryption and authentication, then
the resulting service could work without user interaction and
could satisfy users who trust their email provider with plaintext.
This would complement the spam and malware filtering that
providers already offer and which appears largely effective.
Filtering remains a somewhat more daunting task for smaller
email providers, due to the complex protocols that must be
used and the lack of a large userbase that makes collaborative
filtering or machine learning feasible. Phishing remains a major
problem [74], particularly spearphishing attacks against high-
value targets, as evidenced by high-profile breakins.
O2: Secure email works within closed communities. The
centralized trust model in S/MIME matches the needs of
organizations, as indicated by its deployment within a variety
of companies and in major government departments [20, p.67].
S/MIME removes the burden of fine-grained trust decisions
from users. Its centrally-managed and supported architecture
facilitates holding private keys centrally; despite objections
to plaintext access, this allows an organization to implement
content processing and filtering. Secure webmail services
offer advantages to non-enterprise users, with ProtonMail and
Tutanota reporting over a million users of their services. PGP
works well for small groups, such as a collection of journalists
or activists, who prefer not to trust any third party, despite the
burden of manually exchanging keys. In all of these cases, the
group using secure email primarily forms a closed community,
and secure communication outside the community is often not
supported or plaintext is preferred.
O3: The PGP web of trust remains unsuccessful after 25
years. The web of trust that is so central to the original
design of PGP—including manual key exchange and trusted
introducers—has largely failed. Its use is generally limited to
isolated, small communities. Its appeal is that it allows quick
deployment in small groups without bureaucracy or costs of
formal Certification Authorities, but in practice the downside
is poor scalability and poor usability. Many long-term PGP
supporters have abandoned the web of trust, and developers
are pursuing alternative methods for distributing public keys.
As such, PGP has essentially become more about the format of
messages and keys, rather than the methods used to distribute
and verify keys. This points to a future where most PGP
clients will adapt to handle a variety of key formats, automated
distribution methods, and automated authentication steps, with
the traditional manual trust decisions left to a small minority
with specialized needs.
O4: A global, end-to-end encrypted email system is far off.
No single party controls the email ecosystem, and widespread
deployment of secure email appears to need cooperation of
numerous stakeholders. No individual stakeholder has the
capability to build (or the desire to demand) a secure email
system that provides seamless interoperability for all of the
billions of email users and for all the diverse uses of email.
Indeed, because the different stakeholders have some conflicting
requirements, it is likely that different solutions are needed
for different stakeholders. There appears to be no “silver
bullet” that will bring secure email to the global Internet. This
means that even in the best case, with different solutions being
adopted by different parties, there will likely be interoperability
challenges that act as natural roadblocks and will require
significant investment to overcome. Even if a silver bullet was
possible, our synthesis and evaluation of existing work indicates
that no system comes close to scaling to worldwide demand,
particularly with respect to the PKI needed for obtaining,
distributing, and certifying keys and their mappings to email
addresses.
IX. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DIRECTIONS
A single secure email solution suitable across the full
spectrum of email users and scenarios appears unlikely;
different use cases require different solutions [48]. Here we
sketch some possible paths forward and open questions.
A. Linking existing communities
The operators of secure email communities could work
toward interoperability mechanisms that would enable their
members to send secure email to members of other commu-
nities. Organizations would need to standardize methods for
resolving (e.g., via DNS) the certificate directory or trusted
public key server of a given email domain, and a design to
that enables trust decisions to be made with this collection
of sources for certificates and keys. It is unclear how to
create and share a trust anchor store of the various authorities
involved without replicating the challenges that come with the
certificate authority system in use with the web [23]. As an
alternative, trusted public key servers could be authoritative
over a particular namespace (the most natural being the domain
name in the email address), perhaps with a public ledger like
CONIKS to audit servers. It is unclear how many organizations
would open their certificate directories or public key servers to
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outside queries (this may increase encrypted spam and malware)
or otherwise cooperate in providing this functionality.
B. Bootstrapping end-to-end encryption
Given the ongoing adoption challenges for secure email,
additional attention could be given to helping end users
transition from plaintext to secure email. One possibility is to
start with highly usable software that allows users to easily
send occasional encrypted emails to each other. This could
be done with trust-on-first use exchange of encryption public
keys among a user’s existing circle of contacts, an automated
trusted public key server, or other methods that score high on
usability and deployability. An intriguing option is to deploy
a system similar to Let’s Encrypt, but for email certificates;
email clients can, by means similar to how domain validated
(DV) web certificates are currently issued, automatically prove
ownership of an email address in order to receive a certificate
for the user. An open question is how to help users continue
this transition to additional, stronger methods for authenticating
public keys as they use secure email more frequently. It may
be possible to build a system that migrates from one key
management row in Table I to another, or to build systems that
combine the benefits of multiple rows.
C. Changing secure email functionality
Most efforts to provide secure email have tried to maintain
all of current email functionality. One of the primary tradeoffs
illustrated in our evaluation is between end-to-end encryption
and server access to plaintext, the latter being important for
searching archives and filtering spam and malware. Rather
than trying to meet both needs simultaneously, email clients
could explore offering different functionality for secure email.
One possibility is to mimic secure messaging applications,
which can automatically expire messages after a short lifetime
(configurable by the user). If users view this as a privacy-
enhancing feature, it would remove the expectation for search-
able archives. An open question is whether this or any other
change in functionality meets the needs of some users for some
use cases and might lead to higher adoption.
D. Removing key management barriers
Much of the work in the academic and developer com-
munities has focused on public key discovery. There are
still open questions regarding how non-enterprise users will
manage the full key life cycle, including private key storage,
expiration, backup, and recovery [96, §13.7]. These questions
are complicated by issues such as whether to use separate keys
for encrypting email during transmission as opposed to those
for long-term storage (see §IV-E), how much automation can
be used to simplify key management, and how much users
need to know in order to safeguard them. Use of short-term
keys could alleviate some of these problems but create new
ones. Many of these issues are not unique to secure email and
are still unsolved for applications like secure messaging.
E. Addressing archive vulnerability
In recent years, the security of email has received routine
media coverage for numerous cases of email ‘hacking’: the
digital theft of the extensive information available in the
long-term email archives of various individuals, companies,
and organizations. It is ironic that the most active areas of
research into securing email are largely orthogonal to this
widely reported threat. While this issue might be categorized
as a general data security issue, the way email products and
architectures are designed (e.g., emails archived by default,
mail servers accessible by password) are contributing factors
toward this vulnerability. It is unclear if technical solutions,
revised social norms about email retention, or other approaches
could be helpful in addressing this issue.
F. Overcoming adoption factors
The literature we reviewed in §IV-G indicates that usability
may not be the primary issue preventing users from adopting
secure email products. Researchers have examined human
behavior, as it relates to security and privacy decisions, more
broadly than lab-based usability studies of specific technologies.
This literature includes, as a small sampling, studies of
mental models [18], behavior and micro-economics [4], risk
perception [128], and modelling for human error [25]. While
research summarized previously sheds light on why users claim
to not need secure email [3], [37], [45], [48], [110], [114],
[118], it is less clear if there are underlying factors that can
be better assessed through understanding human behavior or
if increased adoption can be designed for.
X. CONCLUSION
Deployment and adoption of end-to-end encrypted email
continues to face many challenges. Usability issues related to
the day-to-day use of encrypted email remain in many free
PGP-based tools, although they were reasonably addressed
by enterprise S/MIME products starting in the 1990s (e.g.,
IBM/Lotus Notes). Other barriers are important as well. For
example, the issue of decryption key backup, and partially
related, controversial key escrow issues, continues to divide
communities. This results in diverging opinions on the “right”
architectural solution, and progress is frozen as both software
vendors and purchasing organizations try to avoid “wrong”
decisions by maintaining the status quo (plaintext email). Those
affirming the view that all secure email products should allow
warranted law enforcement access by design should never
be expected to agree with the traditional supporters of end-
to-end encryption. Email service providers and organizations
placing high value on malware and spam filtering methods that
require plaintext access are also implicitly opposing (current)
end-to-end encryption technologies, whether or not they are
philosophically opposed. Ironically, even those favoring end-
to-end encryption might put up road-blocks due to their own
internal divisions; e.g., on whether S/MIME is better than PGP
or vice-versa. This stalls progress and, worse, adds technical
complications to support different message, certificate, and key
formats. These examples demonstrate that numerous forces
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often directly, or indirectly, hinder the adoption of end-to-
end encryption. Perhaps the lesson is that we should be less
surprised by its lack of deployment.
It also appears increasingly unlikely that a one-size-fits-all
(i.e., for all target scenarios, environments, and user classes)
solution architecture will emerge. Enterprise organizations and
individual consumers have different views of priorities and
requirements, as well as widely differing levels of technical
support. In the end, perhaps the biggest barrier is the implicit
belief that we must not move forward until finding a one-size-
fits-all solution. A common manifestation of this is those who
oppose the roll-out of products or services that don’t meet
their own particular needs (rather than acknowledging the need
for alternate approaches, and supporting advancement of their
agenda in parallel without blocking that of others). Divided
communities and differing visions are thus a big part of the
problem. Welcome to the real world.
REFERENCES
[1] H. Abelson, R. Anderson, S. M. Bellovin, J. Benaloh, M. Blaze,
W. Diffie, J. Gilmore, M. Green, S. Landau, P. G. Neumann, et al.
Keys under doormats: Mandating insecurity by requiring government
access to all data and communications. Journal of Cybersecurity, 1(1),
2015.
[2] H. Abelson, R. J. Anderson, S. M. Bellovin, J. Benaloh, M. Blaze,
W. Diffie, J. Gilmore, P. G. Neumann, R. L. Rivest, J. I. Schiller, et al.
The risks of key recovery, key escrow, and trusted third-party encryption.
World Wide Web Journal, 2(3), 1997.
[3] R. Abu-Salma, M. A. Sasse, J. Bonneau, A. Danilova, A. Naiakshina,
and M. Smith. Obstacles to the adoption of secure communication
tools. In IEEE S&P, 2017.
[4] A. Acquisti, L. Brandimarte, and G. Loewenstein. Privacy and human
behavior in the age of information. Science, 347(6221):509–514, 2015.
[5] C. Adams and S. Lloyd. Understanding PKI: concepts, standards, and
deployment considerations. Addison-Wesley Professional, 2003.
[6] K. Andersen, B. Long, S. M. Jones, and M. Kucherawy. Authenticated
Received Chain (ARC) protocol. Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-
protocol-09, Internet Engineering Task Force, July 2017. Work in
progress.
[7] E. Atwater, C. Bocovich, U. Hengartner, E. Lank, and I. Goldberg.
Leading Johnny to water: Designing for usability and trust. In SOUPS,
2015.
[8] A. Back. Hashcash-a denial of service counter-measure. Technical
report, hashcash.org, 2002.
[9] W. Bai, M. Namara, Y. Qian, P. G. Kelley, M. L. Mazurek, and D. Kim.
An inconvenient trust: User attitudes toward security and usability
tradeoffs for key-directory encryption systems. In SOUPS, 2016.
[10] D. Balenson. Privacy enhancement for Internet electronic mail: Part
III: Algorithms, modes, and identifiers. RFC 1423, February 1993.
[11] R. L. Barnes. DANE: Taking TLS authentication to the next level using
DNSSEC. IETF Journal, 7(2), 2011.
[12] D. Basin, C. Cremers, T. H.-J. Kim, A. Perrig, R. Sasse, and
P. Szalachowski. ARPKI: Attack resilient public-key infrastructure.
In CCS, 2014.
[13] S. M. Bellovin. Easy email encryption. IEEE S&P Magazine, 14(6):96–
96, 2016.
[14] V. Birk, H. Marques, Shelburn, and S. Koechli. pretty Easy privacy
(pEp): Privacy by default. Internet-Draft draft-birk-pep-00, Internet
Engineering Task Force, June 2017. Work in progress.
[15] N. Borisov, I. Goldberg, and E. Brewer. Off-the-record communication,
or, why not to use PGP. In WPES, 2004.
[16] I. Brown and B. Laurie. Security against compelled disclosure. In
ACSAC, 2000.
[17] J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, D. Shaw, and R. Thayer. OpenPGP
message format. RFC 4880, November 2007.
[18] L. J. Camp. Mental models of privacy and security. IEEE Technology
and Society Magazine, 28(3), 2009.
[19] D. D. Caputo, S. L. Pfleeger, J. D. Freeman, and M. E. Johnson. Going
spear phishing: Exploring embedded training and awareness. IEEE
S&P Magazine, 12(1), 2014.
[20] R. Chandramouli, S. L. Garfinkel, S. J. Nightingale, and S. W. Rose.
Trustworthy email. Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-177, 2016.
[21] D. Chaum. Designated confirmer signatures. In EUROCRYPT. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 1995.
[22] D. L. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital
pseudonyms. CACM, Feb. 1981.
[23] J. Clark and P. v. Oorschot. SSL and HTTPS: Revisiting past challenges
and evaluating certificate trust model enhancements. In IEEE S&P,
2013.
[24] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, and
W. Polk. Internet X.509 public key infrastructure certificate and
certificate revocation list (CRL) profile. RFC 5280, May 2008.
[25] L. F. Cranor. A framework for reasoning about the human in the loop.
In Usability, Psychology, and Security (UPSEC), 2008.
[26] D. Crocker. Standard for the format of ARPA Internet text messages.
RFC 822, August 1982.
[27] D. Crocker, P. Hallam-Baker, and T. Hansen. DomainKeys Identified
Mail (DKIM) service overview. RFC 5585, July 2009.
[28] S. Dechand, D. Schu¨rmann, T. IBR, K. Busse, Y. Acar, S. Fahl, and
M. Smith. An empirical study of textual key-fingerprint representations.
In USENIX Security Symposium, 2016.
[29] W. Diffie and S. Landau. Privacy on the Line: The Politics of
Wiretapping and Encryption (2/e). The MIT Press, 2007. Second
edition 2007 (472 pages), first edition 1998 (352 pages).
[30] R. Dingledine and N. Mathewson. Anonymity loves company: Usability
and the network effect. In WEIS, 2006.
[31] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson. Tor: The second-
generation onion router. In USENIX Security Symposium, 2004.
[32] Z. Durumeric, D. Adrian, A. Mirian, J. Kasten, E. Bursztein,
N. Lidzborski, K. Thomas, V. Eranti, M. Bailey, and J. A. Halderman.
Neither snow nor rain nor MITM...: An empirical analysis of email
delivery security. In IMC, 2015.
[33] C. Dwork and M. Naor. Pricing via processing or combatting junk
mail. In CRYPTO, 1992.
[34] M. Elkins, D. D. Torto, R. Levien, and T. Roessler. MIME security
with OpenPGP. RFC 3156, August 2001.
[35] S. Englehardt, J. Han, and A. Narayanan. I never signed up for this:
privacy implications of email tracking. PETS, 2018.
[36] M. Fagan and M. M. H. Khan. Why do they do what they do?: A study
of what motivates users to (not) follow computer security advice. In
SOUPS, 2016.
[37] S. Farrell. Why don’t we encrypt our email? IEEE Internet Computing,
13(1), 2009.
[38] J. Fenton. Analysis of threats motivating DomainKeys Identified Mail
(DKIM). RFC 4686, September 2006.
[39] D. Floreˆncio, C. Herley, and P. C. Van Oorschot. An administrator’s
guide to Internet password research. In USENIX LISA, 2014.
[40] I. D. Foster, J. Larson, M. Masich, A. C. Snoeren, S. Savage, and
K. Levchenko. Security by any other name: On the effectiveness of
provider based email security. In CCS, 2015.
[41] L. Franceschi-Bicchierai. Even the inventor of PGP doesn’t use PGP.
motherboard.vice.com, September 2015.
[42] J. Franklin, A. Perrig, V. Paxson, and S. Savage. An inquiry into the
nature and causes of the wealth of Internet miscreants. In CCS, 2007.
[43] N. Freed and N. S. Borenstein. Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
(MIME) part one: Format of Internet message bodies. RFC 2045,
November 1996.
[44] A. Fry, S. Chiasson, and A. Somayaji. Not sealed but delivered: The
(un) usability of S/MIME today. In ASIA, 2012.
[45] S. L. Garfinkel, D. Margrave, J. I. Schiller, E. Nordlander, and R. C.
Miller. How to make secure email easier to use. In CHI, 2005.
[46] S. L. Garfinkel and R. C. Miller. Johnny 2: a user test of key continuity
management with S/MIME and Outlook Express. In SOUPS, 2005.
[47] U. Gasser, N. Gertner, J. L. Goldsmith, S. Landau, J. S. Nye, D. O’Brien,
M. G. Olsen, D. Renan, J. Sanchez, B. Schneider, et al. Don’t panic:
Making progress on the “going dark” debate. Berkman Center for
Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, 2016.
[48] S. Gaw, E. W. Felten, and P. Fernandez-Kelly. Secrecy, flagging, and
paranoia: Adoption criteria in encrypted email. In CHI, 2006.
15
[49] R. Geambasu, T. Kohno, A. A. Levy, and H. M. Levy. Vanish: Increasing
data privacy with self-destructing data. In USENIX Security Symposium,
2009.
[50] R. Gellens and J. Klensin. Message submission for mail. RFC 6409,
November 2011.
[51] C. Gentry. A fully homomorphic encryption scheme. PhD thesis, Stanford
University, 2009.
[52] I. Goldberg. Privacy-enhancing technologies for the Internet, II: Five
years later. In PETS, 2003.
[53] I. Goldberg. Privacy enhancing technologies for the Internet III:
Ten years later. In A. Acquisti, S. Gritzalis, C. Lambrinoudakis,
and S. De Capitani di Vimercati, editors, Digital Privacy: Theory,
Technologies and Practices. Auerbach Press, 2007.
[54] I. Goldberg, D. Wagner, and E. Brewer. Privacy-enhancing technologies
for the Internet. In IEEE COMPCON. Digest of Papers, Feb 1997.
[55] I. A. Goldberg. A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for
the Internet. PhD thesis, UC Berkeley, 2000.
[56] D. Goldschlag, M. Reed, and P. Syverson. Onion routing. CACM, Feb.
1999.
[57] D. Goodin. Use of tor helped FBI ID suspect in bomb hoax case. Ars
Technica, December 2013.
[58] C. Hadnagy. Social Engineering: The art of human hacking. Wiley,
2010.
[59] P. Hoffman. Allowing relaying in SMTP: A series of surveys. Internet
Mail Consortium Report, 16, 2002.
[60] P. E. Hoffman. SMTP service extension for secure SMTP over Transport
Layer Security. RFC 3207, February 2002.
[61] P. E. Hoffman and J. Schlyter. The DNS-Based Authentication of Named
Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA. RFC
6698, Aug. 2012.
[62] R. Holz, J. Amann, O. Mehani, M. Wachs, and M. A. Kaafar. TLS in the
wild: An Internet-wide analysis of TLS-based protocols for electronic
communication. In NDSS, 2016.
[63] R. Housley. Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). RFC 5652,
September 2009.
[64] H.-C. Hsiao, Y.-H. Lin, A. Studer, C. Studer, K.-H. Wang, H. Kikuchi,
A. Perrig, H.-M. Sun, and B.-Y. Yang. A study of user-friendly hash
comparison schemes. In ACSAC, 2009.
[65] J. Iedemska, G. Stringhini, R. Kemmerer, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna.
The tricks of the trade: What makes spam campaigns successful? In
SPW, 2014.
[66] M. Jakobsson, K. Sako, and R. Impagliazzo. Designated verifier proofs
and their applications. In EUROCRYPT, 1996.
[67] S. M. Jones, J. Rae-Grant, J. T. Adams, and K. Andersen. Recommended
Usage of the Authenticated Received Chain (ARC). Internet-Draft draft-
ietf-dmarc-arc-usage-02, Internet Engineering Task Force, June 2017.
Work in progress.
[68] B. Kaliski. Privacy enhancement for Internet electronic mail: Part IV:
Key certification and related services. RFC 1424, February 1993.
[69] S. Kamara. Encrypted search. XRDS, 21(3):30–34, Mar. 2015.
[70] R. Kang, L. Dabbish, N. Fruchter, and S. Kiesler. “My data just goes
everywhere:” user mental models of the Internet and implications for
privacy and security. In SOUPS, 2015.
[71] A. Kapadia. A case (study) for usability in secure email communication.
IEEE S&P Magazine, 5(2), 2007.
[72] S. Kent. Privacy enhancement for Internet electronic mail: Part II:
Certificate-based key management. RFC 1422, February 1993.
[73] S. T. Kent. Internet privacy enhanced mail. CACM, 36(8), 1993.
[74] M. Khonji, Y. Iraqi, and A. Jones. Phishing detection: a literature
survey. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 15(4), 2013.
[75] D. S. Kitterman. Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for authorizing use
of domains in email, version 1. RFC 7208, April 2014.
[76] J. C. Klensin. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. RFC 5321, October
2008.
[77] M. Kucherawy, D. Crocker, and T. Hansen. DomainKeys Identified
Mail (DKIM) signatures. RFC 6376, September 2011.
[78] M. Kucherawy and E. Zwicky. Domain-based Message Authentication,
Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC). RFC 7489, March 2015.
[79] A. Laszka, Y. Vorobeychik, and X. D. Koutsoukos. Optimal personalized
filtering against spear-phishing attacks. In AAAI, 2015.
[80] B. Laurie. Certificate transparency. CACM, 57(10), September 2014.
[81] B. Laurie and R. Clayton. Proof-of-work proves not to work; version
0.2. In WEIS, 2004.
[82] E. Lauzon. The Philip Zimmermann investigation: The start of the fall
of export restrictions on encryption software under first amendment
free speech issues. Syracuse L. Rev., 48:1307, 1998.
[83] A. Lerner, E. Zeng, and F. Roesner. Confidante: Usable encrypted
email: A case study with lawyers and journalists. In IEEE EuroS&P,
2017.
[84] K. Levchenko, A. Pitsillidis, N. Chachra, B. Enright, M. Fe´legyha´zi,
C. Grier, T. Halvorson, C. Kanich, C. Kreibich, H. Liu, D. McCoy,
N. Weaver, V. Paxson, G. M. Voelker, and S. Savage. Click trajectories:
End-to-end analysis of the spam value chain. In IEEE S&P, 2011.
[85] R. Levien, L. McCarthy, and M. Blaze. Transparent Internet e-mail
security. In NDSS, 1996.
[86] L. Levison. Dark Internet Mail Environment architecture and specifica-
tions, March 2015.
[87] J. Linn. Privacy enhancement for Internet electronic mail: Part I:
Message encryption and authentication procedures. RFC 1421, February
1993.
[88] D. Liu, S. Hao, and H. Wang. All your DNS records point to us:
Understanding the security threats of dangling DNS records. In CCS,
2016.
[89] D. Margolis, M. Risher, N. Lidzborski, W. Chuang, D. Long, B. Ra-
makrishnan, A. Brotman, J. Jones, F. Martin, K. Umbach, and M. Laber.
SMTP Strict Transport Security, Mar. 2016. Work in progress.
[90] M. Marlinspike. GPG and me. moxie.org, February 2015.
[91] C. Masone and S. W. Smith. Abuse: PKI for real-world email trust. In
EuroPKI. Springer, 2009.
[92] W. Mayer, A. Zauner, M. Schmiedecker, and M. Huber. No need for
black chambers: Testing TLS in the e-mail ecosystem at large. In IEEE
ARES, 2016.
[93] D. McCoy, A. Pitsillidis, J. Grant, N. Weaver, C. Kreibich, B. Krebs,
G. Voelker, S. Savage, and K. Levchenko. PharmaLeaks: Understanding
the business of online pharmaceutical affiliate programs. In USENIX
Security Symposium, 2012.
[94] S. E. McGregor, E. A. Watkins, M. N. Al-Ameen, K. Caine, and
F. Roesner. When the weakest link is strong: Secure collaboration in
the case of the Panama papers. In USENIX Security Symposium, 2017.
[95] M. S. Melara, A. Blankstein, J. Bonneau, E. W. Felten, and M. J.
Freedman. CONIKS: Bringing key transparency to end users. In
USENIX Security Symposium, 2015.
[96] A. J. Menezes, P. C. Van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone. Handbook of
applied cryptography. CRC press, 1996.
[97] L. Meyerovich and B. Livshits. ConScript: Specifying and enforcing
fine-grained security policies for JavaScript in the browser. In IEEE
S&P, 2010.
[98] K. D. Mitnick and W. L. Simon. The art of deception: Controlling the
human element of security. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
[99] S. Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electionic cash system. Unpub-
lished, 2008.
[100] A. Narayanan. What happened to the crypto dream?, part 1. IEEE S&P
Magazine, 11, 2013.
[101] A. Narayanan. What happened to the crypto dream?, part 2. IEEE S&P
Magazine, 11, 2013.
[102] C. Newman. Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP. RFC 2595,
June 1999.
[103] Key management interoperability protocol specification version 1.3.
OASIS Standard, 2016.
[104] H. Orman. Encrypted Email: The History and Technology of Message
Privacy. Springer, 2015.
[105] C. Partridge. The technical development of Internet email. IEEE Annals
of the History of Computing, 30(2), 2008.
[106] T. Perrin and M. Marlinspike. Double ratchet algorithm, revision 1.
signal.org, 2016.
[107] B. Ramsdell and S. Turner. Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (S/MIME) version 3.2 message specification. RFC 5751,
January 2010.
[108] B. C. Ramsdell. S/MIME version 3 message specification. RFC 2633,
June 1999.
[109] The Radicati Group. Email statistics report, 2017-2021, 2017.
[110] K. Renaud, M. Volkamer, and A. Renkema-Padmos. Why doesn’t Jane
protect her privacy? In PETS, 2014.
[111] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and Y. Tauman. How to leak a secret. In
ASIACRYPT, 2001.
[112] U. Rivner. Anatomy of an attack. RSA blog, 1 April 2011.
16
[113] V. Roth, T. Straub, and K. Richter. Security and usability engineering
with particular attention to electronic mail. International Journal of
Human-Computer Studies, 63(1), 2005.
[114] S. Ruoti, J. Andersen, S. Heidbrink, M. O’Neill, E. Vaziripour, J. Wu,
D. Zappala, and K. Seamons. “We’re on the same page”: A usability
study of secure email using pairs of novice users. In CHI, 2016.
[115] S. Ruoti, J. Andersen, T. Hendershot, D. Zappala, and K. Seamons.
Private webmail 2.0: Simple and easy-to-use secure email. In UIST,
2016.
[116] S. Ruoti, J. Andersen, D. Zappala, and K. Seamons. Why Johnny still,
still can’t encrypt: Evaluating the usability of a modern PGP client,
2015. preprint arXiv:1510.08555.
[117] S. Ruoti, N. Kim, B. Burgon, T. Van Der Horst, and K. Seamons.
Confused Johnny: when automatic encryption leads to confusion and
mistakes. In SOUPS, 2013.
[118] S. Ruoti, T. Monson, J. Wu, D. Zappala, and K. Seamons. Weighing
context and trade-offs: How suburban adults selected their online security
posture. In SOUPS, 2017.
[119] M. D. Ryan. Enhanced certificate transparency and end-to-end encrypted
mail. In NDSS, 2014.
[120] B. Schneier and C. Hall. An improved e-mail security protocol. In
ACSAC, 1997.
[121] S. Schro¨der, M. Huber, D. Wind, and C. Rottermanner. When SIGNAL
hits the fan: On the usability and security of state-of-the-art secure
mobile messaging. In EuroUSEC, 2016.
[122] S. Sheng, L. Broderick, C. Koranda, and J. Hyland. Why Johnny still
can’t encrypt: Evaluating the usability of email encryption software. In
SOUPS - Poster Session, 2006.
[123] R. Siemborski and A. Gulbrandsen. IMAP extension for Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) initial client response. RFC
4959, September 2007.
[124] R. Siemborski and A. Melnikov. SMTP service extension for authenti-
cation. RFC 4954, July 2007.
[125] R. Siemborski and A. Menon-Sen. The Post Office Protocol (POP3)
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) authentication
mechanism. RFC 5034, July 2007.
[126] D. X. Song, D. Wagner, and A. Perrig. Practical techniques for searches
on encrypted data. In IEEE S&P, 2000.
[127] E. Sparrow, H. Halpin, K. Kaneko, and R. Pollan. LEAP: A next-
generation client VPN and encrypted email provider. In CANS, 2016.
[128] G. Stewart and D. Lacey. Death by a thousand facts: Criticising the
technocratic approach to information security awareness. Information
Management & Computer Security, 20(1), 2012.
[129] G. Stringhini, M. Egele, A. Zarras, T. Holz, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna.
B@bel: Leveraging email delivery for spam mitigation. In USENIX
Security Symposium, 2012.
[130] G. Stringhini, O. Hohlfeld, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. The harvester,
the botmaster, and the spammer: On the relations between the different
actors in the spam landscape. In CCS, 2014.
[131] N. Unger, S. Dechand, J. Bonneau, S. Fahl, H. Perl, I. Goldberg, and
M. Smith. SoK: Secure messaging. In IEEE S&P, 2015.
[132] F. Valsorda. Op-ed: I’m throwing in the towel in PGP, and I work in
security. Ars Technica, December 2016.
[133] S. Van Acker, P. De Ryck, L. Desmet, F. Piessens, and W. Joosen.
WebJail: Least-privilege integration of third-party components in web
mashups. In ACSAC, 2011.
[134] R. Wash. Folk models of home computer security. In SOUPS, 2010.
[135] A. Whitten and J. D. Tygar. Why Johnny can’t encrypt: A usability
evaluation of PGP 5.0. In USENIX Security Symposium, 1999.
[136] S. Wolchok, O. S. Hoffman, N. Henninger, E. W. Felten, J. A.
Haldermann, C. J. Rossback, B. Waters, and E. Witchel. Defeating
Vanish with low-cost sybil attacks against large DHTs. In NDSS, 2010.
[137] S. D. Wolthusen. A distributed multipurpose mail guard. In IAW, 2003.
[138] T. D. Wu. The secure remote password protocol. In NDSS, 1998.
[139] P. Zimmermann. PGP source code and internals. MIT Press, 1995.
[140] P. Zimmermann. PGP marks 10th anniversary, 5 June 2001.
[141] P. R. Zimmermann. The official PGP user’s guide. MIT press, 1995.
APPENDIX
A. Evaluation Framework
We describe here the properties, cryptographic primitives,
and key management primitives that form the columns and
rows of Table I.
We first describe the properties (columns) we use in Table I.
Security Properties (P1–P7)
P1 Protection from network eavesdropping. The sender and
recipient may wish to keep email confidential during
delivery. A full dot indicates that the message is kept
confidential from all parties other than the sender and the
recipient. A half dot indicates that the sender and receiver’s
mail servers are also able to read the message, but not other
relaying servers or network middleboxes. Importantly, this
column does not evaluate whether envelope metadata and
message headers, including subject lines, are protected.
P2 Protection from network tampering. In addition to in-
specting email content, a mail server or other network
middlebox might alter the contents of email. A full dot
is given if email cannot be modified undetectably by
any entity except the sender, while a half dot allows
modification by the sender and the sender’s mail server.
P3 Sender anonymity. The sender of an email may wish to
remain anonymous. We award a full dot if the sender’s
identity cannot be determined by any individual party, and
a half dot if the sender’s identity is linked to a reusable,
pseudonymous identifier.
P4 Minimal need to trust third parties. The sender and
recipient of an email may want to achieve confidentiality,
integrity, and anonymity without reliance on third parties.
If this is the case, the primitive is given a full dot. If third
parties are required but the trust is distributed (i.e., distinct
third parties must be simultaneously compromised) and/or
agile (i.e., the user can choose which third-parties to trust)
we award a half dot. An empty dot indicates that third
parties are required and trust is neither distributed nor
agile.
P5 Private key only accessible to user. From a security
perspective, it is ideal if end-user signing and/or decryption
keys reside only with the user. Architectures that support
this are awarded a full dot. A half dot indicates that the
private key resides with a third party, however the third
party is denied direct access to the key by a password.
Since passwords might not resist an offline guessing attack,
this is weaker than denying the party any access to the
private key. An empty dot indicates a third party has direct
access to the private key.
P6 Provides a public key audit trail. In a successful imper-
sonation attack, an adversary’s public key is accepted by
others in place of the user’s real key. These attacks can
be detected if a user is able to audit which public keys
have been associated with their identity. If an audit log
is available that provides non-equivocation (see §IV-D),
we award it a full dot. If the audit log does not provide
non-equivocation, then a half dot is given, and if no audit
log is available than an empty dot is assigned.
P7 Responsive public key revocation. If compromise of a
private key is detected, or a key is otherwise invalidated,
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its validity status should be signaled to other users in a
timely manner. Architectures that allow for immediate and
automatic checking of up-to-date revocation information
earn a full dot. Revocation status updates that are untimely,
not guaranteed to eventually arrive, fail open, or are not
supported earn an empty dot.
Deployability Properties (P8–P12)
P8
P9
No email server/client modifications needed. Primitives
that need not change the implementation of email servers
or clients (two columns) have the greatest potential for
deployment. A full dot indicates there are no required
software changes in the server/client, while an empty
dot indicates changes are required. We do not award a
half dot to highlight that the decision to change is the
main hindrance, and the magnitude of the change is less
consequential.
P10 No new infrastructure needed. Some primitives rely on
new server infrastructure to be deployed, e.g., to host a
directory. Such primitives receive an empty dot, while ones
that can be deployed within existing email infrastructure
receive a full dot. For the same reason as directly above,
we do not award a half dot.
P11 Simple initial communication. If a user can send an en-
crypted email to a recipient without needing the recipient
to first adopt the primitive, then a full dot is awarded. If
the sender must first wait for the recipient to adopt the
primitive, then a half dot is awarded. If in addition to
waiting for the recipient to adopt the primitive, the sender
must also wait for the recipient to send their public key
to the sender, then an empty dot is given.
P12 Supports server-side content processing. Primitives poten-
tially limit the ability of email servers to perform services
for the user—e.g., spam and malware filtering, search,
labels. A full dot is given if the primitive does not interfere
with the provider’s ability to process content. A half dot
is given if content processing can be enabled through
cooperation between the email server and a third party
without either party learning the plaintext contents of
encrypted email. Note that research into computing on
encrypted data is active and enables the composition of
both message confidentiality and content processing [69],
however we assume in our evaluation that only existing
techniques are utilized.
Usability Properties (P13–P15)
P13
P14
Effortless public key discovery/validation. The two
columns, effortless encryption key discoverability and
signing key validation, award a full dot when it is possible
for an online user to automatically acquire and validate
any existing secure email user’s public key. A half dot
is awarded if it is possible to acquire and validate public
keys for only a subset of the secure email users. An empty
dot is given if no their is no online public key lookup,
limiting secure email usage to users who have previously
shared keys with each other. We consider encryption and
signing independently because encryption keys are needed
a priori to sending a message, while signing keys can be
validated a posteriori.
P15 Supports private key recovery. In large-scale deployments
of secure email, private key loss is inevitable. If a primitive
allows private key recovery, then a full dot is awarded,
otherwise an empty dot is given. Note that this property
also supports synchronization of a user’s private keys
between their devices, although this is uncommon at
present.
We next describe the primitives (rows) used in Table I.
R1 Plaintext email. Email without any cryptographic protec-
tions.
Cryptographic Primitives (R2–R5)
Cryptographic primitives improve the security of email
through the use of encryption and signatures. Each of these
primitives must be paired with one or more key management
primitives.
R2 Link encryption (§III-A). Encrypting the email content
during transmission (i.e., TLS) prevents passive attackers
from reading email messages. Protection from active man-
in-the-middle attacks depends on which key management
primitives are composed with this primitive. Note that this
primitive only offers strong protection if all links along
the transmission path are properly encrypted.
R3 Signature by originating mail server (§III-B). The sender’s
outgoing mail server signs email to identify the origin
server and provide message integrity.
R4 End-to-end encryption and signing (§IV). Email is en-
crypted and signed with cryptographic keys associated
with end-users. Cryptographic operations are executed at
the end-user (client) devices. The security, deployability,
and usability of this primitive depends largely on the key
management primitive it is composed with.
R5 Hosted encryption and signing (§V-D). Instead of having
end-user devices handle end-to-end encryption and signing,
users upload their key pairs to their respective mail
servers and allow those mail servers to handle encryption
and signing. This primitive can interoperate with end-
to-end encryption and signing, albeit with impact on
property P12.
Key Verification Primitives (R6–R14)
These primitives are responsible for verifying encryption
and signing certificates as well as allowing users to discover
other users’ public keys.
R6 Certificate authority (§IV-B). After generating a key pair, a
user submits their public key and distinguished name (i.e.,
email address) to a certificate authority. After validating
the user’s ownership of the distinguished name and the
private key associated with the submitted public key, the
certificate authority issues a signed certificate that binds
the public key to the distinguished name. When receiving a
certificate—either through an out-of-band communication
18
channel or using a certificate directory (R7)—a relying
client validates the certificate, including verifying the
signature, with trust anchored by a public key in the
system’s trusted root store.
R7 Certificate directory (§IV-D). Users’ certificates are stored
and disseminated by a third party. Disseminated certifi-
cates are trusted because they have been signed by an
authoritative third party (i.e., a certificate authority). Users
share the same set of authoritative third parties.
R8 Manual public key distribution (§IV-C). Users are respon-
sible for exchanging and validating public keys amongst
themselves. Most simply, this happens in person—for
example, at a PGP key signing party. Alternatively, a user
could retrieve a key from a public source (e.g., a personal
website), then validate that key by contacting the other
user over an out-of-band channel (e.g., phone call).
R9 Web-of-trust (§IV-C3). This primitive builds on manual
certificate distribution by adding trusted introducers (e.g.,
PGP). In addition to accepting certificates that they have
personally exchanged, relying clients will also accept
certificates that have been signed (endorsed) by one or
more trusted introducers. This primitive does not aid in
certificate discovery for encryption.
R10 Key packet server (§IV-D). A server that publishes public
keys of users, including metadata regarding the owner of
the key (such as name and email address) and signatures
attesting to the binding of the key with the owner.
Clients are responsible for determining the validity of
any signatures on the packets and deciding if they are
trustworthy.
R11 Trusted public key server (§IV-D). A server that publishes
public keys of users, asserting a binding of the key to an
owner (such as an email address). The server is trusted to
provide valid bindings. This primitive relies on a secure
connection between clients and the public key server—for
example, using TLS.
R12 Public ledger (§IV-D). A ledger publishes certificates or
key packets in a manner that makes them visible to other
parties. In particular, clients can examine a history of
all certificates or key packets that the ledger has made
available for any entity, allowing them to detect rogue
certificates or keys and server equivocation.
R13 Trust on first use (§IV-F3). With this primitive, users
attach their public keys or certificates to all outgoing
email messages, regardless of whether signed or encrypted.
When a recipient receives a public key or certificate for
the first time, the recipient’s client associates that public
key or certificate with the sender’s identity. In the future, if
a new public key or certificate is received, the recipient’s
client must decide whether it is a valid update or an attack
(an issue warranting further research).
R14 Shared secret (§V-B). Instead of using key pairs (i.e.,
public key cryptography), clients can encrypt messages
using a shared secret (i.e., symmetric key cryptography).
These secrets could be a symmetric key or more likely a
string both users know (e.g., password) that is hashed to
a symmetric key. Secrets are shared in person or over an
out-of-band channel that provides confidentiality.
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